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Abstract The concept of boundary work has been put forward as an analytical
approach towards the study of interactions between science and policy. While the
concept has been useful as a case-study approach, there are several weaknesses and
constraints when using the concept in a more systemic analysis of the interactions
between knowledge production and sustainable development decision-making at
the international level, such as its inability to capture the diversity of institutions
involved in such boundary work. Another inability involves a lack of conceptua-
lisation of the impacts of the specific conditions of intergovernmental decision-
making, such as rules for representation and the mode of negotiation. This chapter
suggests complementing the concept of boundary work with a configuration
approach based on a two-dimensional conceptualisation of the boundary space in
international decision-making that allows the positioning of institutions with regard
to their degree of politicisation and their position in terms of national and regional
representation. Such an approach could be a useful guide in the further conceptua-
lisation and application of the boundary concept.
7.1 Introduction
In the study of interactions between science and policy in sustainable development
decision-making, the concept of boundary work has recently emerged as a promising
approach which focuses on the social processes at the boundary between the produc-
tion of scientific and other types of knowledge as well as decision-making processes.
The concept goes against earlier representations of the science-policy interface which
are based on science and policy as distinct and separateworlds depicting science as the
world of neutral and independent facts and policy making as the world of values.
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Instead of questioning how scientific knowledge is best transferred into the policy
domain in order to ‘inform’ politics, boundary work focuses on the various types of
interactions which take place in the sphere between science and politics. This opens
the ‘black box’ of the science policy interface as a simple line acrosswhich knowledge
must be transferred. It also questions the implicit assumption that such transfers can
take place in a manner that is value neutral and without modification of knowledge
content. Furthermore, boundary work assumes bidirectional exchanges and discourse
between knowledge production and policy making, leading to the notion that science
and social order are co-produced in mutually interdependent processes rather than
independent social domains.
While the concept is originally developed in the context of studying science-
policy interactions in national decision-making processes, it has also been effec-
tively applied in the context of international decision-making on sustainable
development. In their evaluation of the effectiveness of scientific assessments in
influencing international decision-making on environmental issues, Mitchell et al.
note that assessments
have influence to the extent that they involve long-term dialogue and interactions in which
potential users of an assessment educate scientists about their concerns, values priorities,
resources and knowledge of the problem, while scientists educate potential users about the
nature causes, consequences and alternatives for resolution of the problem at hand as well
as the ways such knowledge is arrived at. Co-production implies that assessments are
influential to the extent they are bidirectional, with science shaping politics, but also
politics shaping science. (Mitchell et al. 2006: 324)
In their earlier review of knowledge systems for sustainable development, Cash
et al. (2003) find that
those systems that made a serious commitment to managing boundaries between expertise
and decision-making more effectively linked knowledge to action than those that did not.
Such systems invested in communication translation and/or mediation and, thereby more
effectively balanced salience, credibility and legitimacy in the information they produced.
(Cash et al. 2003: 8089)
Both of these conclusions are based on the analysis of large numbers of case
studies, many of which have used the concept of boundary work as a heuristic guide
or as an analytical lens through which to evaluate the effectiveness of specific
assessments and other knowledge producing processes in influencing international
decision-making on environmental issues.
This contribution will explore the application of the boundary work concept in a
broader sense to describe the work of the various types of institutions, actors and
processes which populate the space between science and policy on the international
level. It will also examine their contributions to managing the boundary, and the
interrelations among them. The following section reviews the origins and key
features of the concept. Section 7.3 discusses its application to interactions between
science and policy making both in general terms, as well as with a view to adopting
a more systemic perspective which captures the diversity of institutions and actors
involved in boundary work at the international level. Section 7.4 proposes
complementing boundary work with a configuration approach which captures this
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diversity and directs attention to the interactions between the multiple processes
involved.
7.2 Boundary Work: The Concept and Its Origins
Thomas Gieryn (1983) describes the phenomenon of boundary work as
ideological efforts by scientists to distinguish their work and its products from non-
scientific activities [. . .by attributing. . .] selected characteristics to the institution of science
[(. . .)] for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual
activities as non-science. (Gieryn 1983: 782)
Based on an analysis of such demarcation efforts of scientists against religion,
‘pseudo-sciences’ defend the autonomy of science against efforts to restrict its
activities in the name of national security. Indeed, Gieryn shows that boundary
work is a rhetorical style which can be used by ‘ideologists of a profession or
occupation’ to: expand authority or expertise into domains claimed by other
professions or occupations; monopolise professional authority and resources in
order to exclude rivals; protect autonomy over professional activities by excluding
members for consequences of their work; and may even be used within science to
demarcate boundaries between different disciplines (ibid.: 791). He further
concludes that boundaries of science are ambiguous because: the characteristics
attributed to science are sometimes inconsistent; boundaries are contested by
scientists with different professional ambitions; and boundaries result from the
simultaneous pursuit of separate professional goals requiring boundaries that are
built in different ways (ibid.: 792).
In short, Gieryn’s work shows that the original concept of boundary work is seen
as a rhetorical tool applied by scientists primarily to further the interest of their
profession rather than establishing unambiguous, scientifically grounded definitions
of what constitutes science or how science is defined in a certain discipline. Despite
the fact that they are applied by scientists, the establishment of boundaries cannot
necessarily be considered a scientific exercise in itself.
Sheila Jasanoff (1987, 1990) applies the concept of boundary work to investigate
interactions between scientists and policy makers. She starts from the observation
that science has been able to maintain its status as ‘provider of truths’ even though it
is widely recognised that knowledge is indeterminate and can be interpreted in
many ways, because of the adherence to shared ‘Mertonian’1 norms ‘that foster
1 Introduced by Robert K, Merton, the Mertonian norms are a set of institutional priciples that
describe the ‘ethos of modern science: Communalism (results of scientific research are common
property of the scientific community); Universalism (all scientists can contribute to science
regardless of race, nationality and gender); disinterestedness (scientists should not mix personal
beliefs or activism with the presentation of their research results); originality (scientific claims
must contribute new knowledge); and scepticism (validation through critical scrutiny). See:
Merton (1973).
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cohesiveness in science, even though its practitioners come from divergent geo-
graphic, cultural or linguistic backgrounds’ (Jasanoff 1987: 196). The authority
derived from these norms is reinforced by a number of rules which govern the
practice of science such as high standards for entry into the scientific professions,
rules for quality control exercised by ‘invisible colleges’, ‘research circles’ or other
informal networks that control the diffusion of scientific knowledge’ (ibid.). This
cognitive authority of science comes under pressure when scientists are called upon
by policy makers to provide advice in areas which are at the frontiers of science,
and where knowledge is particularly uncertain and indeterminate resulting in a most
fragile consensus among scientists (ibid.: 197).
Earlier models depict science advice as a unidirectional process of scientists
delivering facts or ‘truth’ to decision makers as basis for informed decisions about
issues affecting, or affected by the physical laws of nature. In direct contrast to this,
Jasanoff develops a model in which
‘truth’ emerges from an open and ritualized clash of conflicting opinions, rather than from
the delicate and informal negotiations that characterize fact-finding in science. (ibid.)
According to her model, legitimacy in decision-making is achieved through the
‘public reconstruction of the scientific basis for regulation’. The process gives rise
to competing claims of authority between science and policy making with regard to
the interpretation of scientific findings, which in turn challenges the disinterested-
ness and certainty of science. The result is a ‘partial removal of cognitive authority’,
which renders explicit the assumptions and uncertainties embodied in scientific
research and thereby allows policy makers to show that ‘the interpretation of
indeterminate facts reflects the public values embodied in legislation as well as
the norms of the scientific community’ (Jasanoff 1987: 198).
While the process of science’s public deconstruction followed by reconstruction
of the rationale for decision-making in the policy arena increases the legitimacy of
policy making, it challenges the self-image of science as a disinterested search for
truth. Furthermore, the public demonstration of uncertainty and disunity among
scientists may damage the public image of scientists and may lead to questions
about whether or not they truly merit the status as well as the symbolic and material
rewards which they enjoy in society. To protect themselves from such negative
impacts, scientists have to establish and continuously reinforce the boundaries
between science and policy. The boundary is thus a contested space around
which scientists and policy makers compete for cognitive authority over the
interpretation of indeterminate facts. In essence, the contested boundary arises
out of different views over how much decision-making power should be granted
to scientists in areas where scientific knowledge is insufficient for decision-making –
either because of lack of data and uncertainty, or because of the indeterminacy of
knowledge. This gives rise to competing claims which make it impossible to take
‘legitimate decisions’.
In her 1987 paper, Jasanoff investigates three ‘contested boundaries’ (or more
precisely three strategies to establish the boundary between science and politics,
and thus the distribution of decision-making authority): trans-science, risk
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assessment and peer-review. Trans-science addresses the grey zone between sci-
ence and policy, which is characterised by questions such as ‘which can be asked of
science and yet which cannot be answered by science’ (Jasanoff 1987: 201; citing
Weinberg 1972). Scientists argue that the cognitive indeterminacy revealed by the
policy making process lies outside of ‘real’ science in the realm of trans-science.
This separation is used to argue that, while policy makers may claim authority over
issues of trans-science, science itself should remain the undisputed preserve of
scientists. Therefore deconstructionist techniques should only be regarded appro-
priate for issues of trans-science, not genuine science. Jasanoff shows that
Weinberg’s main objective is to ‘shield science against the taints of subjectivity,
bias and disharmony that it acquires in the policy environment’. In her conclusion,
Jasanoff states that this approach ignores the key procedural concerns of policy
making, most importantly the question of who should decide on issues which fall
within the boundaries of science and policy, that is, where science is unable to
provide unambiguous answers to the questions that policy makers have to address.
Similarly, Jasanoff argues that risk assessment and peer review are used to
advance particular views about the extent to which scientists should control
decision-making at the frontiers of knowledge. Peer review of suggested regulation
by scientific experts, for example is often demanded by the industry in order to shift
the balance of decision-making power away from regulatory agencies. Indeed, from
the perspective of the industry, these agencies may well be biased towards exces-
sive or overly strict regulation. Because of their impact on the distribution of
decision-making power, boundary strategies can be instrumentalised by those
who have stakes in the regulatory decisions at stake.
These considerations give rise to further research on the activities which take
place at the boundary between science and policy making and the actors and
organisations involved in such work. In her 1990 book ‘the fifth branch’ Jasanoff
explores the work of science advisers in policy making (Jasanoff 1990). Here,
Jasanoff makes the case for a more detailed analysis of the processes which
determine decision-making and the role that science has within these processes.
She depicts two schools of thought with regards to the role of science in decision-
making. The first school of thought is the technocratic view, according to which,
bureaucrats are technically incapable of distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ science
and therefore call for a greater involvement and influence from scientists in the
decision-making process. The second school of thought is the democratic view,
which holds that decision makers fail to incorporate a sufficient range of values in
their decision-making, favouring the inclusion of a broader set of viewpoints in the
decision-making process beyond narrowly technical viewpoints. In line with the
idea that contending views over the role of science in decision-making represent a
struggle of different interests over discretion in decision-making, Jasanoff observes
that commercial and industrial interests favour the technocratic view, while interest
groups such as environmental, labour and consumer movements support the demo-
cratic view (Jasanoff 1990: 15–16).
Based on a review of the work carried out by scientific advisory committees in
US regulatory agencies, Jasanoff derives a number of conclusions with regard to the
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characteristics of successful boundary processes. First she highlights that what is
considered to be ‘good’ science in decision-making is the result of negotiations,
since ‘when stakes are high, no committee of experts, however credentialed, can
muster enough authority to end the dispute on scientific grounds’ (Jasanoff 1990:
234). Negotiation is at the heart of the construction of regulatory science, which
highlights the role of advisory committees as forums where scientific and political
conflicts can be negotiated simultaneously. The role of the scientific expert is then
to stabilise the results of negotiation against further attempts of deconstruction
through his or her ability to validate research, certify scientific methods, define
standards of adequacy of scientific evidence and approve inferences made from
scientific studies and experiments (ibid.: 237). The conduct of scientific advice as
negotiation provides legitimacy to the outcome.
In order to be successful, boundary work should be non-adversarial to avoid an
unproductive deconstruction of science and fostering of appearance of capture (ibid.:
246). Committee membership should reflect disciplinary breadth, which may be
challenging for small committees. The advisers populating committees also need to
be more than mere technical experts to be able to transcend disciplinary boundaries,
synthesise knowledge from several fields, and to understand the limits of regulatory
science and the policy issues confronting the agency (ibid.: 243). These requirements
may make it difficult to find a sufficient number of policy advisers, which may lead to
conflicts of interests resulting from long-term and encrusted relationships between
agencies and a small group of skilled advisors. Finally, Jasanoff notes that the
advisory process must recognise that scientific knowledge is in perpetual flux and
demands constant renegotiations, which in turn calls for allowing more flexibility in
the rules and norms which govern the work of advisory committees than those of
administrative decision-making. The problem of advisory processes then, is not so
much to protect decision-making from capture by scientific experts who are
influenced by technocratic interests, but to ‘harness the collective expertise of the
scientific community, so as to advance the public interest’ (Jasanoff 1990: 250).
In short, the work of Gieryn, Jasanoff and their colleagues directs attention
towards the processes of negotiating the boundary between science and policy as
well as the rules and organisations which structure such processes, including the
rules for selecting participants of advisory committees, structuring the discourse
within these committees, and for the type of outputs expected from them.
Further research concentrates on the role of boundary work and how it stabilises
the boundary between science and politics. This is achieved through investigating
the role of boundary organisations and their outputs, known as boundary objects or
standardised packages. The rationale for conducting such research is, on the one
hand, the concern that constructivist arguments about the contingency of these
boundaries could lead to a dangerous erosion ‘of the cognitive authority of science
by legitimizing relativism’, and a fear about a decay of the mutually productive
relationship between science and liberal democracy (Guston 1999: 89). On the
other hand, scholars believe that by clearly portraying science as it is practiced,
constructivist accounts can help to improve the position of science in society and
‘recover the human face beneath science’s rationalist mask’ (ibid.).
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Star and Griesemer (1989) introduce the notion of ‘boundary objects’ as common
products of negotiations at the boundary between science and policy. Boundary
objects are knowledge products, such as reports, methodologies or interpretative
frameworks which are ‘both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity
across sites’ (Star and Griesemer 1989). A similar concept is that of ‘standardized
packages’ which is a means to ‘define a conceptual and technical work space [. . . by
combining] boundary objects with common methods in more restrictive but not
entirely definitive ways’. Standardised packages seek to homogenise and facilitate
repeated interactions among practitioners from both sides of the boundary between
different social worlds while maintaining their integrity within their respective
worlds (Guston 1999, citing Fujimura 1992). In this way, they effectively function
as interfaces for the translation and transfer of different kinds of knowledge for the
purpose of collaborative knowledge development.
David H. Guston further develops the concept of boundary organisations using
principle agent theory. He suggests that the relationship between policy makers and
scientists can be represented as a contractual relationship, similar to that between
other economic agents, in which policy makers ‘hire’ researchers to deliver exper-
tise on specified issues. The principal is faced with the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection may lead to the identification of
scientists pursuing a specific agenda in relation to the policy problem at hand,
whereas moral hazard describes the agent’s incentive to cheat or shirk or otherwise
exploit the principal’s lack of information. To address these problems, the principal
will put into place mechanisms for monitoring the agent’s behaviour and for
verifying the results of his research. Such mechanisms include procedures for
accountability, in particular financial accountability, but will also lead to the
development of boundary objects and standardised sets. In Guston’s case study of
innovation and technology transfer originating from the US National Institute of
Health, boundary objects include procedures for ‘innovation disclosure’ which
facilitate the collaborative identification of research results with innovative or
market potential, as well as incentives and procedures to facilitate the application
for patents. The collaboration between governmental research laboratories and non-
federal actors such as private firms, is governed by Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CARDAs). Indeed, Guston identifies these as the key
standardised set of the boundary institutions in his case study. Based on these
observations Guston identifies the following shared characteristics of boundary
organisations (Guston 1999: 93):
• ‘They provide a space that legitimizes the creation and use of boundary objects
and standardized packages;
• They involve the participation of both principals and agents, as well as
specialised (or professionalised) mediators; and
• They exist on the frontier of two relatively distinct social worlds with definite
lines of responsibility and accountability to each’.
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The specialised mediators in his case study are technology transfer experts who
oversee the collaborative process of technology transfer and report to the govern-
mental agent. The government creates incentives for them which directly depend on
the effectiveness of technology transfer, thus establishing a new intermediary agent
who is himself in a principal-agent relationship with the researcher.
To summarise, the emergence of the boundary concept has shifted the way in
which science and knowledge are perceived in decision-making. They are no longer
viewed in terms of the ‘pipeline’ and ‘information deficit’ models which presume
that knowledge is produced by and delivered to decision makers very much like a
commodity or resource towards a model of co-creation or joint fact finding, in
which knowledge holders and decision makers work together to develop common
understandings of problems and available pathways of action as a basis for legiti-
mate and socially robust decision-making. The boundary model directs attention to
the procedural aspects of knowledge creation and use for decision-making. Rules
for participation and balance of influence emerge as important factors for successful
boundary work next to the mere quality and appropriateness of the knowledge at
hand.
7.3 Boundary Work in International Decision-Making
in Sustainable Development
Most of the research on boundary work has thus far been carried out in the national
context, with the majority of studies analysing science-policy interactions in US
decision-making processes. This raises the question of whether the concept can be
usefully applied to boundary work on the international level. A number of
differences come to mind with regards to both the representation of ‘policy’ and
‘science’ as well as in the institutions which frame the interactions. These
differences may not be in line with the explicit and implicit assumptions of the
boundary work.
Miller (2001) discusses three weak assumptions of the boundary concept which
influence its applicability to the international context. First, the concept ignores the
diversity of institutions and practices which exist within both science and politics.
Scientific practices and discourses vary with disciplines, institutions and networks,
and scientists within disciplines frequently disagree about the representation of
their knowledge and the implications derived from it. Similarly, perceptions, policy
styles and forms of interaction vary across institutions and sectors. On the national
level, the assumption of uniformity may nevertheless be acceptable, since decision-
making on sustainable development takes place within policy domains which have
distinct styles of policy politics – a specific combination of cognitive styles and
interaction. Over time, this combination generates particular public epistemologies
about the validity and use of different types of knowledge within the domain
(Hoppe 2010: 181). On the international level, however, boundary work must
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span the diversity of scientific and political institutions from a large number of
countries and policy domains which interact with each other. This leads to
confrontations not only between different national policy styles, framings and
policy theories, but also between diverse and culturally determined perceptions as
well as different ways of identifying and describing problems in different languages
(ibid.).
Second, the concept oversimplifies the boundary between science as a ‘fine
bright line’ using inadequate representations of pure science and pure politics.
This ignores the diversity of institutions that exist between the two sides which
are neither science nor politics ‘but combine elements of the two in remarkable
different ways’. Miller illustrates this diversity with a map of institutions involved
in boundary work on climate change. The map (Fig. 7.1) includes both institutions
inside and outside the formal climate change regime, as well as US national
Fig. 7.1 US and international Organisations involved in boundary work on climate change
(Source: Jasanoff andWynne (1998)). Note: NCAR ¼ National Center for Atmospheric Research;
WMO ¼ World Meteorological Organisation; UNEP ¼ U.N. Environment Programme; IPCC ¼
U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; IGBP ¼ International Geosphere-Biosphere
Programme; SBSTA ¼ U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice
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institutions. The entire landscape includes 11 institutions, each of which produces
its own ‘amalgamation of norms, practices, discourses and knowledges’ on climate
change (Miller 2001: 485, citing Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
The third weakness identified by Miller is that the boundary concept presents an
overly static view of science and politics. The last two decades have seen the
emergence of a vast array of new institutions involved in boundary work on the
international level which has led to a constant rearrangement of institutions and
how they relate to each other. At the same time ‘definitions and standards for
expertise are deeply contested across cultural and geopolitical divides, as are
notions of appropriate political institutions for carrying out public sector manage-
ment for the planet as a whole’ (Miller 2001: 485). This means that institutional
arrangements are constantly in flux and there is rarely a negotiation process which
ends with the same constellation of institutions involved with which it started.
One may add a fourth weakness here, which becomes relevant if one looks at
boundary in an intergovernmental context rather than from the perspective of
domestic engagement in international decision-making, as Miller does. Boundary
work on the international level takes place within the constraints and practices of
intergovernmental decision-making. This means that the discourses and processes
of boundary work will always be affected by the rules for representation and
decision-making which characterise political processes on the international level.
Since states are the main actors of multilateral decision-making, any form of
boundary work has to provide for adequate codes of representation in order to be
considered legitimate. This has a number of implications for the conduct of
boundary work in an international context. First, the criterion of representation of
states competes with the criterion of representation of relevant knowledge and
scientific expertise. Subsidiary bodies and smaller expert panels in particular suffer
from difficult debates about balance in representation either on a country or
regional level (Kohler et al. 2011). In most cases, the concern about representation
trumps the concern for diversity and relevance of expertise of the individuals that
who will be invited as experts. The need for representation limits both the number
of experts who can participate from a given country or region, as well as the
individuals chosen by countries. The more politicised an issue is, the more countries
will tend to send diplomats rather than experts.
Assessment processes attempt to circumvent this problem by establishing
criteria for the scientists and experts to be nominated by countries. However
many countries will select their participants in a way which ensures that the
contribution from those experts is not against their political positions in the
negotiation process at hand. Any institution or forum involved in boundary work
on the international level will in one way or another be affected by the need to
ensure national representation as well as representation with regard to different
types of expertise and knowledge. In many cases the intergovernmental negotiation
setting will act as a bias which will give primacy to the national requirement.
The second constraint arises from the mode of decision-making in international
fora. The great majority of intergovernmental decision-making processes require
unanimity by all member states to take decisions. Rules of procedure which allow
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for majority voting are the exception and are only established within a framework
that clearly identifies which decisions can be taken by voting. An example can be
seen with repetitive operational decisions such as subjecting new species to the
trade restrictions under CITES or adding new chemicals to the list of substances to
be monitored by the Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Materials. In theory, the
unanimity rule makes it possible for a single country to block consensus, even if an
acceptable amalgamation of values and knowledge has been achieved among all
other participants. In reality, the pressure to achieve an outcome often leads to a
race to the bottom in terms of the substantive content of an agreement as the
majority accepts to water down elements of a decision in order to accommodate
minority concerns. Scholars in international relations have identified the pattern
that international agreements tend to be either ‘broad and shallow’, meaning that
many states participate in an agreement with limited impacts; or ‘narrow and deep’,
meaning that a small group of states participates in an agreement which yields large
benefits from cooperation (Barrett 1999: 525). If one can consider the breadth and
depth of an agreement as preliminary measures of the success of boundary work
during the negotiation phase of an agreement, then one can expect that the logic of
negotiation under the unanimity condition creates an additional hurdle for boundary
work on those issues which are most difficult to agree upon.
In decision-making bodies which operate under the one-country-one-vote and
unanimity principles, the main participants are country delegates who are bound by
the instructions of their capitals. The instructions themselves are the result of
processes of policy development and decision-making that may have included
boundary work to varying extents, depending on the practices, cognitive styles
and modes of interaction of the policy domains involved. Delegates have thus
limited flexibility to accommodate the concerns of others both in terms of
bargaining as well as with regard to their ability to embrace new concepts and
boundary objects that may be developed in the course of the negotiation or
presented by other participants, such as civil society actors. On the other hand,
delegates’ instructions usually do include some flexibility for making concessions
in order to be able to strike mutually agreeable deals with their opponents. Whether
these flexibilities can be used for the creation of new boundary objects again
depends on the political culture and practices in different countries. Some countries
give their delegates a lot of autonomy to decide how they will represent the interests
of their countries, for instance by providing instructions that are formulated in terms
of general objectives. In contrast, other delegates must work with narrowly
formulated options for operational text. Delegates from some countries have to
ask permission from their capitals for even minor changes, while other countries
select their delegations such that the relevant policy domains and fields of expertise
are represented at the meeting to allow for the delegation to react to new proposals
which could not be anticipated. A typical phenomenon at the final stages of
negotiations are delegates who make hectic last minute phone calls to get permis-
sion to agree to the final deal, which often involves explanations of a new compro-
mise formula.
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The situation is further complicated by the fact that many countries negotiate in
coalitions or regional blocks. This involves another level of decision-making at
which boundary work may or may not occur. The amalgamation of individual
positions inevitably involves further discussions on facts and values within
coalitions and regional groups. However, similar to the international level
negotiations, it depends on the mode of decision-making and the flexibility of the
delegates’ instructions as to whether the result will lead to a further increase in
the robustness and acceptance of the common position or a watering down of the
agreement towards a lowest common denominator.
In assessment processes, the practice of ‘negotiating scientific consensus’ can
lead to oversimplification and inadequate reduction of the complexity of both the
science and the values that are behind the effort-reduction to the lowest common
denominator replaces amalgamation. While assessment processes publish compre-
hensive reviews of the state of the art in science, including a consideration of
different viewpoints and in some cases even contradictory findings, what gains
traction in the policy making process are the severely reduced summaries for policy
makers – sometimes even only parts thereof. Only these can be considered as
outcomes of completed boundary work, since only these parts become the basis
of decision-making. On the other hand, the knowledge produced by assessment
processes becomes the basis for boundary work in numerous other institutions and
forums that act as additional channels through which they can have an indirect
impact. IPCC assessment reports, for instance, are the most important reference for
making the case for action against climate change through advocacy groups or
policy think tanks. These actors engage themselves in boundary work at different
levels which has an influence on national positions as well as the course of the
negotiations in international decision-making forums. Many of their outputs should
thus be seen as intermediary boundary objects which enable boundary work in other
channels.
The third constraint of boundary work emerges from the negotiation mode which
prevails in the majority of international decision-making forums. Any outcome of
international negotiations is either designed as international law, or will be
interpreted in the context of existing international law and obligations. Soft law
instruments, such as declarations or non-legally binding treaties and decisions for
implementation have proven to exert substantial influence on policy making in
many countries and, in many common law countries they can have a direct impact
on court decisions. Therefore, many countries treat any negotiations as if the
outcome would be legally binding, even if that is not provided for by the mandate,
or the decision on the legal nature of an instrument will only be decided at the very
end of a negotiation. This means that in the final stages, and often throughout the
entire process, negotiations are led by legal, rather than scientific experts. Legal
experts however will focus on legal issues, such as consistency with existing
international laws and obligations, compatibility with national legal systems and
legal clarity. This is often at the cost of scientific adequacy and relevance. Once
negotiations have entered into the legal ‘codification’ mode, they tend to become
less receptive to new knowledge and ideas, at least as long as this knowledge is
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communicated by non-legal actors. Furthermore, the final stages of a process are
often marked by a decrease in trust among participants as confusion over legal
concepts may lead negotiators to accuse others of trying to reverse previous
agreements or of using existing decisions and other legal arguments strategically
to their own advantage. The erosion of trust is further aided by the fact that
countries become increasingly aware of the costs and benefits of proposed
agreements and therefore switch to strategies of distributive bargaining: ensuring
fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits takes primacy over the common
objective of solving global problems.
The final stages of a negotiation are therefore carried out under the shadow of
both existing law and the anticipated legal impact of the text under negotiation.
Under certain conditions, this shadow can extend far into the early stages of a
negotiation, thus leading participants to engage in distributive legal bargaining at
a point in time when there has not yet been enough boundary work done to provide a
basis for a successful completion of the negotiation. In other words, the amalgam-
ation of facts and values is not yet sufficiently mature to withhold the erosion of
trust in the process of legal bargaining.
This extension of the shadow of the law can occur for several reasons. One is the
informal rule prevailing in many negotiating forums not to reopen text for discus-
sion which has been previously agreed. Despite the formal rule that agreements are
adopted as a package and thus ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, the
request to make changes in agreed language is often interpreted as bad faith by
other delegations. While this rule is a necessary convention to prevent legal
negotiations from backlash and endless circles of revisiting the same issues, it
can also prevent delegates from testing different framings and approaches during
a negotiation to select the most suitable approach. What is more, when trust is low,
some delegates will categorically disagree with any text on the table in order to
ensure that they keep their options open until the very end. In extreme cases this
practice can neutralise previous informal agreements, including any boundary
objects which may have been embodied or referred to in the initial text.
Another factor is that boundary work and legal negotiations are often carried out
under the auspices of the same institution, notably subsidiary bodies that provide
advice to a governing body or conference of the parties of the same process.
Without a mandate which clearly identifies the nature of the subsidiary body’s
work and delimits it from the actual negotiation process, such bodies tend to
transform into preparatory meetings for the actual negotiation process. If countries
expect that the outcome of a subsidiary body will be a draft decision which may be
difficult to reopen for further discussion, they will send legal experts rather than
scientists to represent them in these processes. The longer the shadow of the law,
the more reluctant countries will be to let non-legal experts speak and engage in an
open form of discourse, for the fear that their proposals will become fixed into legal
concepts that may be interpreted against their own interest or original intention.
To summarise, the intergovernmental setting and the shadow of the legal
negotiations of international sustainable development decision-making have fun-
damental impacts on the way in which boundary work is conducted at the
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international level. Much more than in national decision-making processes, it must
be recognised that boundary work is not a simple bridging process between science
and policy that is carried out in a single locus, but that it is composed of many
processes in a complex web of loci which deliver partial amalgamations of facts and
values from different perspectives. These partial amalgamations are often comple-
mentary, but in many cases they compete, since they represent different
configurations of values brought forward by different sets of stakeholders and
scientists who have participated in the process.
Secondly, it must be recognised that the negotiation process is an integral part of
boundary work on the international level. Similar to the inseparability of
discussions on facts and values, international boundary work is inseparable from
the multilateral negotiation process. Delegates as well as scientists will always be
influenced by, or even pressured to, represent the positions of their countries. The
degree to which representation influences the outcome of boundary work can be
depicted as the distance from the actual negotiation process. The more influence a
process of boundary work can be expected to have on a negotiation process, the
stronger the participants’ bias towards their countries’ positions in the negotiation
processes itself. The closer a boundary organisation is located to decision-making,
the more politicised its deliberations will be.
7.4 From Boundary Work to Boundary Configurations
In order to account for these factors, it is useful to conceive of the boundary
between knowledge production and decision-making in an intergovernmental
setting as a two-dimensional space defined by the axes of science and policy as
well as national and international processes (Fig. 7.2). The further to the right a
process or institution is located, the more politicised it can be expected to be. The
higher up it is situated, the stronger will be the constraints of representation in the
conduct of boundary work. An exception may be the intermediary organisations
which are depicted here in the middle of both axes. This group itself represents a
large diversity of institutions which may or may not be internally organised
according to representative principals. Such organisations may participate as
experts in assessment processes, as observers or representatives of civil society or
major groups in subsidiary bodies and negotiations. These organisations often
provide different types of knowledge to boundary work in other institutions or
processes, or are themselves loci of boundary work.
The main assumption underlying this representation is that the boundary space is
populated by different institutions and organisations which produce partial
amalgamations of facts and values that are influenced by their position within the
space as well as other factors such as membership, interests or ideological
conceptions. This representation should also allow for the location of different
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institutions and processes involved in boundary work with regard to their position
in terms of politicisation and constraints through presentation and negotiation in
intergovernmental decision-making processes. This enables the development of a
more differentiated conceptualisation of the types of processes and discourses
taking place within these organisations and how these are influenced by their
position. In addition, this also develops their relationships to one another. For
instance, it may be possible to develop conjectures about the conditions under
which institutions or actors occupying similar or overlapping positions within the
boundary space will behave competitively or collaboratively. Similarly, one may
ask under which conditions institutions positioned on opposite ends will comple-
ment each other. This is done either by delivering ‘compatible’ partial
amalgamations of facts and values which can be consolidated into inclusive and
robust decisions, or by further developing boundary objects provided by other
actors in the space.
Figure 7.3 presents the configuration of institutions and processes involved in
boundary work from a US perspective, based on the work of Jasanoff and Wynne
(1998) presented in Fig. 7.2. It should be noted that the location of the different
institutions is for illustration only. The exact locations would need to be determined
based on extensive empirical research including a methodology for comparing the
degree of politicisation in each organisation and the extent to which the work is
influenced by the mode of representation. Nonetheless, some interesting questions
can be asked based on this representation. The first is that of potential divergences
Fig. 7.2 Institutions and processes involved in boundary work on international sustainable
development decision-making (compiled by the author)
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between the mandate and the de facto impact of a boundary organisation. The IPPC,
for example, is structured as a scientific assessment based on review and synthesis
of relevant scientific information. Its reputation and the political nature of climate
change issue, however, have the effect that its outputs have a much more direct
impact on the negotiations than assessments in other areas. IPCC Scenarios and
results are often cited by delegates and other actors in the negotiation process, and
even if they are not intended to be policy prescriptive, they may turn out to have
exactly that effect by locking in negotiations on a certain scientifically formulated
target. An example of this impact is the 2 target for climate change put forward by
many in the run-up to the Copenhagen climate change talks.
Another approach could be to compare the position, internal processes and
outputs of IPCC and SBSTA. Despite the fact that both bodies are seen to be
scientific in nature, their processes, outputs and impacts on the negotiations may
vary considerably.
Comparison across issue domains could also be an interesting avenue to com-
plement the concept of boundary work. Figure 7.4 provides an illustrative position-
ing of the main scientific institutions involved in boundary work on biodiversity
decision-making. For simplicity, the representation considers only the major inter-
governmental institutions involved, while displaying EU institutions to illustrate
the positioning of regional groups. The main differences illustrated here are as
Fig. 7.3 Configuration of institutions and organisations involved in boundary work on interna-
tional decision-making on climate change (Source: compiled by the author based on Jasanoff and
Wynne (1998))
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follows: (1) the major scientific assessment (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment)
spans the international and regional level through the inclusion of sub-global
assessment processes on the basis of an inclusive stakeholder approach. (2) The
new Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES) is, according to its mandate, positioned further to the right than
IPCC. This is because its mandate is to evaluate the results of other assessments and
provide recommendations on concrete policy options, rather than providing mere
scientific synthesis. Its de facto impact may however be less significant than that of
the IPCC because of the higher complexity of biodiversity issues and an overall
lower politicisation of the issues at hand. The CBD’s SBSTTA on the other hand is
more political than the UNFCCC’s SBSTA as it has evolved into a preparatory
meeting for the Conference of the Parties rather than a body for scientific
deliberation.2
Finally, this illustration also displays additional processes of boundary work at
the regional level, in this case within the European Union. They are carried out
both in the network of European Environment and Advisory Councils (EEAC) as
well as in regional coordination processes under the EU Council or the EU
Commission.
Fig. 7.4 Illustrative configuration of institutions and processes involved in boundary work on
biodiversity decision-making (Source: compiled by the author)
2 Recent reforms in the SBSTTA mode of operation, may have changed its position towards the
left.
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These examples illustrate the potential of a configuration approach to a more
systemic study of boundary work in international sustainable development
decision-making. Such an approach would combine a number of theories and
methods to expand and complement the concept of boundary work.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the challenges and constraints of applying the concept of
boundary work to interactions between knowledge production and international
sustainable development decision-making. The analysis finds that, while the con-
cept of boundary work has proven useful as a case-study approach, it must be
complemented in order to gain a more systemic view of international science-policy
interactions. Several conceptual weaknesses must also be addressed, including its
inability to capture the diversity of institutions involved in boundary work at the
international level and the implications and constraints of the modes of representa-
tion and negotiation present in boundary work in the context of intergovernmental
decision-making. The chapter suggests the development of a configuration
approach which allows the positioning of institutions involved in boundary work
with regard to their degree of politicisation and mode of representation. Such an
approach would yield a more systemic understanding of boundary work for inter-
national sustainable development decision-making. In addition it could guide the
development of theories and specific hypotheses on how the positioning of
institutions influences the processes of boundary work taking place within them,
as well as their behaviour towards other boundary institutions and organisations.
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